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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to review empirical findings and explanations relevant to the issue when 
concurrent decisions are integrated and when they are not integrated. There are few directly related 
studies. Therefore, the review also covers related phenomena involving the effect of a prior outcome on 
subsequent decisions, sunk-cost effects, and escalation. An important question emerging from the 
literature review is the question why integration have been obtained in studies of effects of prior 
outcomes, sunk cost effects, and escalation, at the same time as this has not been the case with 
concurrent decisions? One reason may be the existence of mental accounting in these studies. Another 
is that choices are riskless. An idea for further research is to make subjects being able to think through all 
possible consequences in a concurrent decision problem. By explicitly illuminating the risk or uncertainty 
to the subjects, it may be possible to obtain integration in concurrent decisions. 




People often find it difficult to make decisions, that is, to select among different available options, because of value 
conflicts and uncertainty. Besides, sometimes decisions are difficult because they are independent (Brehmer, 1992; 
Huber, 1990). In daily life, it is often the case that a decision maker (DM) has experienced the outcome of a 
previous choice when facing a new. A decision maker may also make several decisions at the same time.  
Theories of decision-making are either normative entailing utility maximization or descriptive. Some of the latter 
aiming at explaining how people make decisions are similar to normative theories in that they are based on value or 
utility, that is, the decision maker (DM) is assumed to first assign a utility or value v(x) to each outcome x, then to 
select the option with the highest value. An example is prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). Recently, an alternative “reason-based” approach has been 
proposed (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1992). This approach identifies various reasons and arguments that are 
purported into and influences decision. Choices are explained in terms of the balance of reasons for and against the 
various options. In the absence of a comprehensive descriptive theory, both value-based and reason-based analyses 
may contribute to the understanding of decision-making. 
In contrast to normative decision theory developed in economics (e.g., von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1947), 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), have some similarity to reason-based approaches in its assumption 
that the DM edits options. Editing operations include framing outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference 
point. Such framing also entails segregating or integrating prior outcomes or decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A decision frame based on a ”minimal account” implies that outcomes of a 
particular choice are evaluated independently of prior outcomes. Such a decision frame may frequently be 
employed because it ”(i) simplifies evaluations and reduces cognitive strain, (ii) reflects the intuition that 
consequences should be causally linked to acts, and (iii) matches the properties of hedonic experience which is 
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more sensitive to desirable and undesirable changes than to steady states” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 457). 
According to this definition, a mental account can be looked upon as a frame for evaluation. Important questions are 
when does an individual take into account a prior experience and what mechanisms may account for integration? 
Integration is here seen as referring to a possible addition of values or utilities to the expected outcomes or 
consequences. Integration as a phenomenon may be explained as follows: Two decisions may be regarded as 
dependent (integrated), if the utility of the consequences of the first decision affects the evaluation of the utility of 
the consequences second decision. If this is not the case, the two decisions are independent (segregated). Consider 
the following example taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1981) which illustrates when concurrent decisions are 
made independently, although integration would lead to a higher value: 
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, then indicate the 
options you prefer. 
 
Decision (i). Choose between: 
     A. a sure gain of $240 
    B. 25% chance to gain $1000, and 75% chance to gain nothing 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a sure loss of $750                                                                                                                                              
D. 75% chance to lose $1000, and 25% chance to lose nothing 
A majority of subjects chose A and D (in italics). However, in choosing between the following two alternatives they 
chose B´: 
A´. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $760 
B´. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $750 
As realized, alternative B´ is C and D combined whereas A´ is A and B combined. Thus, subjects did not make the 
choices which overall maximized expected utility. Presumably, they framed each of the decision problems in a 
minimal account. 
The basic aim of this paper is to review empirical findings and explanations relevant to the issue when concurrent 
decisions are integrated and when they are not integrated.  There does however exist only a few directly related 
studies, and because of this, this paper will also cover related phenomena, involving the effect of a prior outcome on 
subsequent decisions (Thaler & Johnson, 1990: Gärling & Romanus, 1997), sunk-cost effects (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Laughhunn & Payne, 1984) and escalation (Brockner, 1992). These phenomena do have a lot in common, but 
may have different explanations. 
2. Review of Previous Research 
2.1  Prior Outcome Effects 
Despite having experienced the outcome of a previous choice, a decision maker may disregard a prior outcome 
when evaluating the outcomes of a related new choice. This has been demonstrated in some studies. In a study by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984), it was found that subjects that had lost a theatre ticket were unwilling to replace it 
with a new ticket. The authors also reported that subjects in another experimental group ignored the loss of the same 
amount of money when buying a ticket. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that when an individual is about to evaluate an option, the individual sets 
up a mental account that specifies the advantages and disadvantages associated with the option. The overall value of 
an option thus derives from the balance of its advantages and disadvantages in relation to the reference state, usually 
the status quo. Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p.456) define a mental account as ”an outcome frame which specifies 
(i) the set of elementary outcomes that are evaluated jointly and the manner in which they are combined and (ii) a 
reference outcome that is considered neutral or normal”. Consider the following example, called “the theatre ticket 
problem”, taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p.457): 
 
Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the admission price of $10 per ticket. As you enter the theatre, 
you discover that you have lost the ticket. The seat was not marked, and the ticket cannot be recovered. 
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Would you pay $10 for another ticket? 
and 
Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is $10 per ticket. As you enter the theatre, you 
discover that you have lost a $10 bill.  
Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for the play? 
Observe that these problems do not describe the same situation. In one case you have lost a ticket and in the other 
case you have lost a $10 bill. However, your total wealth has decreased with $10 in both situations. This implies 
that the difference in the two situations should be irrelevant from an economic point of view. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981) the outcomes can be framed in terms of a minimal, topical, or a 
comprehensive account. The minimal account includes only the differences between the options, while disregarding 
their common features. If the options were evaluated in terms of a topical account, the local context would also play 
a part in the evaluation. A comprehensive account would be accomplished by taking into account, for instance, 
savings or monthly expenses. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) attributed the differences found in their study (the 
theatre ticket problem) to the topical organization of mental accounts. The majority of subjects (88%) were 
unwilling to spend another $10 bill after having lost a ticket, but they were willing to spend that sum after having 
lost an equivalent amount of cash. Going to the theatre is normally viewed as a transaction in which the cost of the 
ticket is exchanged for the experience of seeing the play. Buying a second ticket raises the cost of seeing the play to 
an unacceptable level for most subjects. The results found by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) in the theatre ticket 
problem may have been due to the fact that the two versions of the problem differed in substance. It may be more 
enjoyable to save $5 on a $15 purchase than $5 on a larger purchase. It is also possible that it feels harder to deal 
with having to pay twice for the same ticket than to lose $10 in cash. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that 
the observed modal preferences were reversed in the two problems because losses are more aversive than costs. 
Thinking of the $5 as a payment makes it more acceptable than thinking of the same amount as a loss. This implies 
that an individual´s subjective state can be improved by framing negative outcomes as costs rather than as losses. 
The possibility of such psychological manipulations may explain a paradoxical form of behavior named the dead-
loss effect (Thaler, 1980). Thaler discusses as an example a person who develops a tennis elbow in a short time after 
having paid his membership fee in a tennis club, but continues to play in order not to waste his investment. This can 
be regarded as a sunk cost effect. 
Singer, Singer and Ritchie (1986) investigated the role of transactions (e.g. exchanging the ticket for the play) as a 
mediator of responses to the ”theatre ticket” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), 
and tested this in three experiments. They included a clue that made the loss of money more closely associated with 
the play. By stating that the lost bill had been budgeted or set aside specifically for the play, 17% fewer subjects 
were willing to buy a ticket than in the lost condition without the budgeting cue. They also reported finding that the 
responses obtained for Problems A and B (similar to Kahneman and Tversky´s problems) showed an even stronger 
”reversal effect” than what was obtained by Kahneman and Tversky. Singer et al.´s responses provided some 
further support to Kahneman and Tversky´s argument that the (imagined) transaction is a salient feature of the 
problem that influences the way in which a problem is structured. Singer et al. also tested a hypothesis that 
proposed that social interaction also is an important feature of “the theatre ticket” problem, but this hypothesis 
received no support. Although their results provided some support for Kahneman and Tversky ´s (1984) 
interpretation that the transaction implied by ”going to the theatre” triggers the topical organization of a mental 
account, individual differences in problem framing or mental accounting processes may be important in some 
contexts. 
Both Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Singer, Singer, and Ritchie (1986) interpreted their results in terms of 
what they called the ”transaction hypothesis”. They argued that the presence or absence of a transaction would 
induce people to construct different mental accounts of the equivalent monetary loss and to make different choices. 
Henderson and Peterson (1992) accounted for the same phenomenon by script processes and categorization. 
According to their  ”cognitive script” hypothesis, the loss of a ticket was shown to be present in the going to the 
theatre ”script”, while the loss of the note was not included in this script. Henderson and Peterson (1992) argued 
that categorization theories focus on the processing and grouping of information, and mental accounting focuses on 
the outcomes of that processing and grouping. Both mental accounting and categorization theories allow for the 
formation of expectations concerning an event or element. Henderson and Peterson (1992) also reported that 
subjects were more willing to purchase another ticket when the loss was removed in time from the theatre. 
Distancing the ticket loss realization from the theatre simultaneously increased the percentage of subjects providing 
an affective rationale. 83% of the subjects stated that they would buy another ticket because they really wanted to 
see the play, compared to 65% of the subjects in the theatre condition.   
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Conducting four experiments and building upon the earlier work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Bonini, Rumiati 
and Legrenzi (1993) tested whether the previous found phenomenon was affected by the way the loss was 
presented. They also tested the predictive validity of the ”transaction” and ”script” hypotheses. In an experimental 
condition, the subjects lost a bank note that had been put by in order to purchase the ticket (referred to as a goal-
directed note). In another condition the subjects lost a note of the same amount. This note had not been put by to 
purchase the theatre ticket (referred to as a generic note). The results of that experiment (replicated by Rumiati, 
Bonini, & Legrenzi, 1993) showed that the tendency to persist was greater in the generic note loss situation than in 
the goal-directed note loss situation. Bonini, Rumiati and Legrenzi (1993) argued that the differing status of the two 
types of loss (ticket and goal-directed note vs. generic note) as opposed to the going to the theatre script would be 
the cause of the different tendency to persist that was found in the two loss situations. The effects that was found by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and by Singer et al. (1986) was not replicated when the economic transaction 
involved a cash outlay that was only a part of the total price of the ticket. In yet another condition, the subjects had 
not started any economic transactions as the ticket (or note) was presented as a birthday present. This allowed the 
authors to discriminate the validity of prediction between the economic transaction hypothesis and the cognitive 
script hypothesis. The results obtained from this particular experiment confirmed only the predictions of the 
cognitive script hypothesis.  
The results of Bonini, Rumiati and Legrenzi´s (1993; 1995) four experiments dealing with the theatre ticket 
problem suggests that the presentation modality of acquisition (or loss) of some goods, such as a theatre ticket or a 
bill, affects the tendency to persist in keeping to a previously taken decision. This is in line with the notion of 
”framing” and its effectiveness in affecting people´s expressions of framing. Thus, framing effects provides 
evidence against the descriptive validity of utility theory, and the effects also violates the principle of description 
invariance which states that the way a situation is described should not affect one´s decision.  
Other studies (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Gärling & Romanus, 1997; Gärling, Romanus & Selart, 1994; Laughhunn & 
Payne, 1984; Linville & Fischer, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) have shown that prior 
outcomes, or sunk outcomes as they also may be termed, have an effect on subsequent decisions. The questions 
these studies rise, are when, why and how subjects integrate instead of segregate a prior outcome?  
2.2 The Hedonic Editing Theory 
According to Thaler´s (1985) hedonic editing theory, people prefer segregated over integrated gains, and integrated 
over segregated losses. Events can be integrated or segregated either or both topically (according to source) and 
temporally (according to time). Whether value is maximized if a prior outcome is integrated or segregated in the 
case of large losses and small gains (mixed losses) depends on their relative sizes. Thaler (1980) argues that 
individuals use a psychological accounting system established when the first choice in the sequence is made. This 
psychological accounting system keeps track of debits and credits for the DM as the outcomes from the sequential 
choice process develops over time. Thaler and Johnson (1990) argued that subjects integrate when it maximizes 
utility (hedonic editing). Using the value function of prospect theory, Thaler and Johnson (1990) noted that value is 
maximized if gains are segregated, losses integrated, and small losses integrated with large gains (mixed gains). 
Whether value is maximized when a prior outcome is integrated or segregated in the case of large losses and small 
gains (mixed losses) depends on their relative sizes.  
Thaler´s approach rests on the distinction between mentally integrating or segregating two events before they are 
evaluated. Two events are said to be mentally integrated if they are combined before being subjectively evaluated. 
The subjective value of the combined pair of events, denoted here by Vc(x,y) is given by:  
Vc(x,y) = V (x,y)        (1) 
In this case, x and y are mentally combined. Two events are said to be mentally segregated if they are separately 
evaluated (by the prospect theory value function) before being combined. The subjective value of the separated 
events, denoted here by Vs(x,y),is given by:   
Vs(x,y)= V(x)+V(y)      (2) 
What determines whether two events are mentally segregated or integrated? Thaler and Johnson (1990) suggested 
that events that are temporally contiguous (close in time) are more likely to be integrated. If events are integrated, 
they are combined before being evaluated. Temporal contiguity is likely to facilitate integration of two outcomes, 
while temporal separation is likely to lead to segregation of outcomes. 
An important question then becomes: What difference does it make whether two events are integrated or not? Due 
to the prospect theory value function being nonlinear and steeper for losses than for gains, v(x+y) will generally 
differ from v(x)+v(y). The total subjective value that will be derived from a pair of events, will differ depending on 
whether they are integrated or segregated (if equations 1 and 2 are valid). This implies that segregation and 
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integration will typically lead to different value, because of the nonlinear function of the prospect theory value 
function.  
Thaler tested these predictions in an experiment in which subjects compared four pairs of hypothetical financial 
scenarios, each corresponding to one of four types of possible outcomes. These outcomes were respectively pure 
gains, pure losses, mixed gains and finally mixed losses. Results obtained from Thaler´s study provided evidence 
that a prior gain could under some circumstances increase a subject´s willingness to gamble. This finding was 
labelled the ”house money effect”. In contrast, prior losses were found to decrease the willingness to take risks. It 
was also found in the same study that when subjects have had prior losses, outcomes which offered the opportunity 
to break even were especially attractive. People who do not adjust their reference point as they lose would be 
expected to take bets they normally would find unacceptable. Thaler´s findings have been supported by the 
observation that bets on long shots are most popular on the last race of the day (McGlothlin, 1956). 
One of Thaler´s (1985) hypothesis was that people edit outcomes in the way that makes them happiest. The hedonic 
editing hypothesis (Thaler & Johnson; 1990) implies that subjects will choose to have the events occur separated 
when segregation would be preferred, and combined when integration would be hedonically optimal. Support for 
this prediction was only partial. Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that subjects preferred to temporally separate 
losses. To account for this violation of the hedonic editing model, they proposed an alternative quasi-hedonic 
editing hypothesis, according to which people follow the rules of hedonic editing for gains and for mixed outcomes, 
but are unable to integrate two losses into one single loss. Quasi-hedonic editing differs from hedonic editing in two 
ways. First, it is assumed that different editing rules apply to losses than to gains and mixed outcomes. And second, 
the quasi-hedonic editing model invokes an additional mechanism, loss sensitization. Results showed that subjects 
indicated that they preferred to experience the losses separately. This result was obtained repeatedly, for small and 
large losses, for monetary and for nonmonetary losses, as well as for related and unrelated events. The obtained 
results produced a severe blow to the hedonic editing hypothesis. A tentative interpretation of Thaler and Johnson´s 
results, is that while a small to moderate loss may sensitize a subject to further losses of roughly the same 
magnitude, a large loss may actually numb the individual to additional small losses.  
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 in Thaler and Johnson´s (1990) study suggested that a prior loss would sensitize 
people to subsequent losses of a similar magnitude. Subjects reported that the loss of $9 would hurt more after an 
initial loss of $30 than if the $9 loss had occurred by itself. This increase in loss aversion would tend to produce risk 
aversion for gambles that risk additional losses, and the results supported the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis.  
According to Thaler and Johnson, integration is not always spontaneous. In general integration takes place when 
cancellation is not a possible strategy, and in more special cases when losses can be offset against larger gains. The 
importance of cancellation suggests that when the equivalence of outcomes is transparent, integration might occur. 
It seems plausible that the failure to integrate losses in Thaler and Johnson´s study would be even stronger across 
attributes. This means that a loss in one domain will increase the loss aversion felt with respect to other domains. Or 
as Thaler and Johnson describes it, which would hurt most: a toothache alone, or a toothache after being rejected for 
a new job? 
2.3 The Renewable Resources Model 
Linville and Fischer (1991) proposed another model of hedonic editing based on temporal preferences, drawing on 
both decision theory and stress research. This hypothesis is referred to as the Renewable Resources (RR) model, 
and its aim is to account for why current outcomes are sometimes integrated with and sometimes segregated from 
prior outcomes. The RR model is based on four assumptions. First, evaluations of individual events are assumed to 
follow the prospect theory value function. Furthermore, people are assumed to possess limited loss-buffering 
resources that are consumed in the process of coping with negative events, but it is also assumed that these 
resources are naturally renewable over time. These loss buffers include physiological, cognitive, and social 
resources that act to moderate the adverse effects of negative (or stressful) events. If two negative events occur 
during the same time period, they will have to share the loss-buffering resources that are available during the actual 
time period. Similarly, people are assumed to possess limited gain-savouring resources that are consumed in the 
process of experiencing positive events that occur in close temporal contiguity (e.g. two events that occur in the 
same time period). These resources are also assumed to be naturally renewable over time. The gain-savouring 
resources include time, cognitive resources, and physical energy. For instance, savouring a positive event may 
involve cognitive processes such as cognitively elaborating the event and its implications for one´s goals and for 
one´s self-evaluation, and savouring the emotional high that is associated with the event. Such cognitive processes 
require time and considerable cognitive resources. If two positive events occur during the same time period, they 
must share the gain-savouring resources that are available during that period. 
The final assumption rests on the premises that people are value maximizers whose preferences for segregating or 
integrating events are assumed to be based on the anticipated value that is associated with experiencing two events 
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separately or at the same time. The assumption that negative events deplete a person´s resources is consistent with 
research that has showed that prolonged states of stress have a variety of negative emotional, cognitive, and 
physiological effects, including effects on the neuroendocrine and immune systems (Baum et al., 1987).  
In Linville and Fischer´s (1991) study, three different domains were investigated. The subjects were found to show 
similar preferences for events from these three domains (academic, social and financial). Subjects had to indicate 
whether they wanted to experience two negative or two positive events on the same or different days. Losses and 
gains were found to be segregated due to temporarily limited (but renewable over time) loss-buffering and gain-
savouring resources. Mixed gains and mixed losses were always integrated because gains were found to have a 
buffering effect. Linville and Fischer (1991) obtained support for the assumption that gains or losses were 
segregated whereas mixed gains and mixed losses were integrated. In Linville and Fischer´s (1991) study, no 
restrictions were imposed on whether a loss preceded a gain or the reverse. Subjects were found to be more likely to 
integrate a loss and a gain if the gain was social, regardless of which domain (academic, social, and financial) the 
loss occurred in. This may suggest that positive social events could be perceived to be better loss buffers than 
positive events in other domains, thereby leading to a stronger tendency to integrate a social gain with a loss in the 
same or another domain. 
The implications of the quasi-hedonic editing model are very similar to those of the RR model. Both theories use as 
a starting point Kahneman and Tversky´s (1979) prospect theory. The RR model has one conceptual advantage over 
the quasi-hedonic editing model, and this is that the RR model relies on a common set of processes to account for 
gains, losses and mixed outcomes. In contrast, quasi-hedonic editing uses different editing assumptions for losses 
than for gains or mixed outcomes. The two theories represent different views of the source of preferences for 
temporally segregating or integrating events. According to editing models, the segregation or integration of events 
at the encoding stage plays a critical role in the evaluation processes. Time thus becomes critical only because it 
constrains the encoding processes. According to the RR model, on the other hand, time is critical because the 
availability of gain-savouring and loss-buffering resources is seen to be time-dependent (renewable over time). 
Table 1 below gives a summary of the model predictions for segregating or integrating events. 
Table 1. Summary of predicted preferences in the Hedonic Editing model and the RR model 
Type of event   Hedonic Editing Model         Renewable Resources Model          
Large gain   Different day          Different day (gain-savouring)              
Small gain   Different day          Different day (gain-savouring)             
Large loss   Same day          Different day (multiple-loss avoidance)    
Small loss   Same day          Different day (multiple-loss avoidance) 
Mixed gain    Same day          Same day (loss buffering)                    
Mixed loss   No prediction          Same day (loss buffering) 
Note. Entries in parentheses are hypotheses names for the RR model. 
2.4 The Loss-Sensitivity Hypothesis 
A proposed explanation of integration of prior outcomes is the loss-sensitivity hypothesis (Gärling & Romanus, 
1997). This hypothesis, states that subjects will take into account a prior outcome (gain or loss) only when 
considering a current loss. Thus, when making a second choice, it was hypothesized that subjects would take into 
account the outcome of the first choice. However, according to the hypothesis subjects will do that only if the 
outcome of the second choice involves a potential loss. The loss-sensitivity hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
subjects are prone to minimize disutility. The effect of a prior loss will therefore be to increase the dissatisfaction 
with an expected loss, and the effect of a prior gain to decrease it. These predictions were tested in a series of 
experiments by Gärling and (1997) and Gärling, Romanus and Selart (1994). Gärling and Romanus found in their 
study of gambling decisions (fictitious race-track betting) that subjects predominantly integrated a prior outcome 
when evaluating a current loss. As a consequence, subjects were found to be risk aversive after a loss but risk 
seeking after a gain, which is in accordance with Thaler´s (1985) results. In a subsequent study (Romanus, Hassing 
& Gärling, 1996) integration were found to be reduced when the instructions downplayed the loss. This finding was 
consistent with the loss-sensitivity hypothesis.  
In a study by Boe and Gärling, (2015c) two experiments were conducted in order to test the hypothesis that the loss-
sensitivity principle could be extended to explain integration of the outcomes of two concurrent risky decisions. 
According to the loss-sensitivity principle, only expected loss outcomes of concurrent decisions would then be 
integrated. The results of Experiment 1 revealed to be consistent with the loss-sensitivity principle in that a prior 
outcome was integrated with the expected loss outcome of a current decision. However, there was no evidence for 
integration of the expected loss outcomes of two concurrent decisions. A possible explanation implying that 
outcomes are ignored if they have not yet occurred was then followed up in Experiment 2 where participants were 
offered bonuses to increase their sensitivity either to gains or losses. An effect of the bonus was observed but again 
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there was no evidence for integration of the outcomes of concurrent decisions. Another study by Boe and Gärling 
(2015b) investigated whether causal relatedness and uncertainty of outcomes of concurrent decisions were more 
frequently integrated than unrelated outcomes, and whether certain outcomes were more frequently integrated than 
uncertain outcomes. Participants in one group was asked to choose between buying means-end related and unrelated 
pairs of everyday consumer products, whereas participants in another group were asked to choose between lottery 
tickets with the consumer products as prizes. The results from the experiment indicated that both causal relatedness 
and uncertainty of outcomes of concurrent decisions affected integration. The means and ends were more often 
chosen when they were presented in the same sets of two concurrent decisions than when they were presented 
together with unrelated options or singly. The observed differences were smaller when choices were made between 
uncertain outcomes. Following this line of research, a third study by Boe & Gärling (2015a) was conducted with the 
aim of investigating whether causally related options of concurrent decisions are not evaluated and therefore not 
chosen although their combinations are more attractive than single options. In two concurrent decisions participants 
had to choose between buying means-end related and unrelated pairs of everyday consumer products. Participants 
in one group were sometimes forced to choose the end (or the means), whereas participants in another group were 
always free to choose the end and means. It was found that in the forced choices condition, participants chose the 
means or ends presumably because they attended to the additional benefits. However, when free to make both 
choices participants only chose the ends and means 22% of the time. A possible explanation of why concurrent 
outcomes are not integrated may be because of an attentional bias.  If participants encounter highly attractive single 
outcomes, then they may be satisfied with these and refrain from further search. Boe & Gärling (2015a) refer to this 
phenomenon as an attentional bias, assuming that the outcome of the bias is that participants choose single 
preferred outcomes rather than more preferred combined outcomes. In line with this hypothesis, Boe and Gärling 
(2015b) demonstrated that attractive combined outcomes were never chosen despite that they were riskless and 
causally related. Boe (2015) tested this assumption of an attentional bias in an experiment investigating whether an 
attentional bias explains why decision makers sometimes fail to integrate outcomes of concurrent decisions. The 
participants in this study were asked to make fictitious choices of stores located at different distances where they 
could purchase the same consumer products at different prices. In one condition the participants were asked to also 
make a choice between driving and walking to the stores, in another condition they were asked to choose between 
the stores when they had no other option than to walk or drive. Attitudes toward driving were independently 
assessed by means of a questionnaire. A finding supporting the attentional bias was that participants with a more 
positive attitude toward driving chose more frequently to drive to stores within walking distance than participants 
with a less positive attitude towards driving. 
2.5 The Informativeness Approach 
Another model called the informativeness approach (Klar, 1995) also seeks to explain people´s preferences for 
integrating or segregating events. This approach suggests that people find outcomes to be informative about both 
the target of the outcomes and about the likelihood that similar outcomes will or will not reoccur in the future. As 
found by Klar, people generally preferred positive outcomes to be unrelated to one another, and negative outcomes 
to be related to each other (integration). Three experiments were conducted in order to test the predictions of the 
informational approach. Both in the tested skill dependent and chance driven events, people were found to prefer 
segregated positive outcomes and integrated negative outcomes. The three experiments conducted by Klar, suggest 
that informational considerations contribute to segregation-integration preferences together with the perceptual 
considerations described by mental accounting theory.  
Ross and Simonson (1991) found in their study that subjects had a preference for happy endings. In order to 
examine the effect of happy endings on preferences for integration versus segregation, Ross and Simonson (1991) 
focused on whether people became happier if two opposite sign outcomes were temporally separated or if the two 
occurred simultaneously being reduced to one integrated outcome, as in Thaler´s (1985) study. In one study (Study 
1), they presented subjects with a series of hypothetical choices between sequences that ended with a loss (e.g. win 
$85, then lose $15) or a gain (e.g. lose $15, then win $85). Subjects preferred sequences that ended with a gain. 
Subjects were also prone to prefer segregation when the gain occurred last, no matter what size the loss was. Both 
in Study 1 and in their Study 2, preferences for happy endings were shown to increase preferences for segregation 
of outcomes at the expense of integration. Ross and Simonson (1991) showed that, in situations in which events are 
temporally separated, preferences for integration or segregation of outcomes are determined by the temporal order 
of the events.  
Laughhunn and Payne (1984) conducted a study to investigate how practising managers would choose decision 
frames for sunk outcome problems when the current choices involved risk. The authors investigated two types of 
sunk outcomes, a continue/discontinue variant and an asset disposal variant. In presenting the sunk outcome 
problems to the subjects (60 managers), each problem was described as a brief business scenario that described the 
choice problem, identified the data, and asked the managers to make a choice between two risky options. A second 
business scenario, representing the base gamble, was developed and described the same business scenario except 
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that the reference to earlier history and the sunk outcome were eliminated. According to the authors, choosing 
managers as subjects in the study was justified because of the central role the managers played in resource 
allocation decisions. Depending on the presence of sunk costs or sunk benefits, changes in the percentage of risk 
seeking choices in the subsequent decisions was found. The presence of a sunk outcome problem was predicted to 
result in more risk-seeking choices than compared to a reference base gamble. Results showed that a substantial 
fraction of the managers made choices that were consistent with the use of a psychological account in both of the 
sunk outcome problems. This point to a violation of the principle of framing based on a minimal account. The 
findings also indicated that a substantial number of managers did not cancel history, resulting in that the managers 
utilized the psychological account in some way for framing the sunk outcome problem.   
Laughhunn and Payne (1984) also found that managers were generally more inclined to make choices using the 
psychological account when making personal choices than when making corporate choices. When making corporate 
choices the presence of sunk losses were found to induce a more apparent use of the psychological account, 
compared to sunk benefits of the same amount. For personal decisions the differential impact of sunk losses and 
sunk benefits was mixed based on the problem type. It was found that for the continue/discontinue problems the 
effects of sunk benefits was larger than for that of sunk losses, while the reverse was found for the asset disposal 
problem. Use of the psychological account was found to be extensive in both the continue/discontinue problems and 
for the asset problems, as well as for sunk costs as well as sunk benefits. 
Gärling and Romanus (1997) aimed to investigate whether integration was asymmetric or not, as noted by 
Laughhunn and Payne´s (1984). A prior gain and loss alike tended to be integrated in the evaluation of the current 
loss but not in the evaluation of status quo and the current gain.  The possibility of such an asymmetric integration 
was predicted by Thaler and Johnson (1990), using prospect theory. Predictions of asymmetric integration to be 
used in Gärling and Romanus study were made from the RR model (Linville & Fischer, 1991). According to these 
predictions status quo would not be affected. The evaluation of a current loss would then be made less unattractive 
by a prior gain as compared to no prior outcome, but was not expected to be affected by a prior loss. On the other 
hand, the evaluation of a current gain was predicted to be made less attractive by a prior loss, but would not be 
affected by a prior gain. 
In Experiment 1 (Gärling and Romanus, 1997) a prior outcome had already occurred. The results of Experiment 1 
were shown to be consistent with previous research in demonstrating effects of prior outcomes on risky decisions 
(Laughhunn & Payne, 1984; Linville & Fischer, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). It was 
also found that risk seeking changed to risk aversion after a loss. A prior gain also tended to increase risk seeking, 
leading to the conclusion that prior outcomes appeared to be integrated with current outcomes. The results from 
Experiment 1 showed that integration was asymmetric although inconsistent with the principle of hedonic editing. 
An important difference between the conditions of Linville and Fischer´s study and Gärling and Romanus study 
may have been that a prior outcome already had occurred in the latter study. Therefore, a Experiment 2 was 
conducted in order to investigate whether the degree of uncertainty about the prior outcome was an important 
condition in order for hedonic editing to occur. The results suggested that subjects had a tendency to take into 
account a prior loss even though it was uncertain. However, no other effects were found of the prior outcome. 
The results obtained from the study by Gärling and Romanus (1997) failed to support that integration followed 
value maximization as assumed by Thaler and Johnson (1990) drawing on prospect theory. Neither did the results 
support the RR model based on stress buffering assumptions proposed by Linville and Fischer (1991). As noted by 
Larrick (1993) and Weber (1994), people in risky choices may often be more concerned about avoiding negative 
outcomes than attaining positive ones.  
2.6 The Mobilization-Minimization hypothesis 
Taylor (1991) has suggested another explanation for the occurrence of asymmetrical effects of positive and negative 
events. This hypothesis is called the mobilization-minimization hypothesis. Adverse or threatening (negative) 
events mobilize an individual to try to cope with the situation. This mobilization phase is followed by physiological, 
cognitive and behavioral responses that damp down, minimizes and even erases the impact of that event (Taylor, 
1991). The individual responds to negative events with short-term mobilization and long-term minimization. Fiske 
(1980) found that subjects attended disproportionately to negative information by looking at it longer than they 
looked upon positive or neutral information. Peeters and Czapinski (1990) has showed that negative events elicit 
more causal attributional activity than positive events. They also concluded that negative stimuli lead to more 
cognitive work and more cognitive representations than positive stimuli did. One exception is the Pollyanna 
principle (Matlin & Strang, 1978), which refers to a persistent recall advantage of positive over negative events. 
Negative information may stand out and be disproportionally weighted in judgements. 
A number of recent studies have shown that people typically favour sequences that improve over time (Loewenstein 
& Sicherman, 1991; Ross & Simonson, 1991; & Varey & Kahneman, 1990). Ross and Simonson (1991) noted that 
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the final outcome in a sequence is likely to be the most salient to the DM after the end of the sequence. Preferences 
for improvement appear to be driven in part by adaption and loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Loss 
aversion refers to that people are more sensitive to a loss than to a gain of the same magnitude. The adaption and 
loss aversion explanations are closely related to the concept of a ”contrast effect” (Tversky & Griffin, 1991). 
Contrast effects refer to the effect on one´s evaluation of the present compared with the past or future. If backward-
looking contrast effects are more potent than forward-looking ones, then the net impact of contrast effects will be to 
raise the preferences for improvement over time (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). 
Slovic (1972) proposed a ”concreteness principle” stating that a DM does not frequently allocate the cognitive 
resources required for changing the given format of supplied information. According to the concreteness principle, 
no integration of prior outcomes would be expected unless the format of the decision problem is changed. The 
concreteness principle as an explanation of integration, gained support in a study by Romanus, Gärling and 
Karlsson (1995). In this study, two experiments were conducted in order to test if concreteness and loss sensitivity 
could explain why a DM sometimes add (integrates) a prior outcome to the expected outcomes of a current risky 
decision. Subjects were presented with different descriptions of gambling choices, where they had to imagine that 
they had not gambled, that they had gambled and won, or that they had gambled and lost. In one session subjects 
had to rate the likelihood that they would gamble in a subsequent race. In another session they had to rate how 
satisfied they would be with not betting, with betting if they won, and with betting if they lost, respectively, in the 
subsequent race.  
In Experiment 1, in a condition without concrete integration descriptions, as has been found previously (Gärling & 
Romanus, 1997, Gärling et al., 1994), subjects were expected to integrate the prior outcome only with the expected 
loss. In a second condition of Experiment 1, subjects were expected to also integrate the prior outcome with the 
other outcomes. The results of Experiment 1 showed more integration for descriptions of the bets which concretely 
integrated the prior outcomes with all the outcomes of the current choices. A consistent finding of Gärling and 
Romanus (1997) and of Gärling et al.´s (1994) studies has been that multiple reference points were employed. This 
point to a violation of both normative principles and prospect theory. Results, supporting the loss-sensitivity 
hypothesis have implied that in evaluating an expected loss, one reference point was used. Here the prior outcome 
was not assimilated with the reference point. In evaluating the other outcomes, when the prior outcome has been 
assimilated with the reference point, another reference point was used. The question that was raised in Experiment 2 
was therefore if concrete integration descriptions likewise would lead to such a inconsistency. This was expected if 
subjects were to integrate only the prior outcome when the description made it concrete. The results that were 
obtained from Experiment 2 showed a specific effect of concrete-integration information. The subjects tended not to 
integrate a prior outcome with any other outcome than those included in the concrete-integration descriptions. This 
can be seen as a violation of both normative principles (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
2.7 The Sunk Cost Effect 
Sunk costs may be regarded as a special case of prior outcome when the DM has invested in one of the current 
options. A sunk cost involves any prior investment of ”money, effort, or time” (Arkes & Blumer, 1985, p.124).  
Sunk cost effects on decision-making are irrational from the perspective of both classical economic and normative 
decision theories. Laughhunn and Payne (1984) chooses to replace sunk cost with the term sunk outcomes, which 
can be either positive (a sunk benefit) or negative (a sunk cost). 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) reported a series of experiments which demonstrated sunk cost effects. In several 
questionnaire experiments, contrary to normative decision theory a majority of subjects chose a less preferred 
option which they had bought at a higher price. For instance, a majority of subjects chose to cancel a less expensive 
weekend ski trip although knowing that they would like it better than a more expensive alternative. In another 
scenario subjects playing the role of presidents of a company were asked to decide to continue or discontinue 
investments in the development of a product facing anticipated difficulties to sell it. Subjects who were informed 
that large investments had already been made chose more frequently to ”throw good money after bad money”. 
Demonstrating external validity of these findings, subjects participating in a field experiment were found to attend 
more theatre shows if they had paid the full price for the subscription to a series than if they received a discount on 
this price.  
A surprising result found by Garland (1990) is that incremental costs had absolutely no effect on subjects 
willingness to make further investments in the project. This means that the subjects willingness to authorize 
additional resources for a threatened research and development project was both positively and linearly related to 
the proportion of the budget that already had been expended. This is a result that is contrary to normative decision 
models. Garland and Newport (1991) also found that there was one strong and significant sunk cost effect on the 
decision to continue with an unprofitable course of action, based on the proportion of a total budget expended on 
that particular action. Garland and Newport´s (1991) results suggest that sunk cost effects on decision making are a 
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function of the proportion of allotted resources (e.g., a budget), expended on the project rather than absolute 
expenditures. Another result from the same study was that relative rather than absolute magnitude of sunk cost had 
a significant impact on subjects reported likelihood of committing additional funds to some action. These findings 
support the idea that a topical organization of mental accounts underlies sunk cost effects in decision-making. 
2.8 The Status-Quo and Omission Biases 
Closely related to sunk cost are two types of biases named status-quo and omission biases. The term status-quo bias 
has been used to describe people´s tendency of ”doing nothing or maintaining one´s current or previous action” 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Preferences for the status quo, in risky as well as in riskless choices, is generally 
explained in terms of loss aversion (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
An alternative explanation of status-quo bias is that changing the status quo requires an act, while keeping the 
status-quo requires only an omission or inaction. Preference for the omission option may also result from 
unwillingness to choose between the available options (Ritov & Baron, 1992). Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988) 
found that the status quo bias was manifested in an anchoring effect, in which current decisions would be anchored 
to prior decisions. The same authors also found that a status-quo bias can be revealed as a tendency in a multistage 
betting game to become risk aversive after not betting. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that people 
experienced a more intense emotional reaction to events that involve actions relative to events that had identical 
outcomes but which did not involve actions. Individuals felt better when a positive outcome resulted from action 
rather than inaction. Anticipation of such positive or negative feelings could account for the status-quo bias or the 
omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1992). Kahneman and Miller (1986) explained this phenomenon in terms of norm 
theory. Outcomes are perceived as worse when subjects can easily imagine that a better outcome could have 
occurred.  
Brockner & Rubin (1985) has shown that in sequential decisions, a persistence in status quo choices may be 
motivated by the individual´s reluctance to ”cut his losses”. Or explained in more general terms, motivation may be 
triggered by a desire to justify previous commitments to a (perhaps failing) course of action by making subsequent 
commitments. From a prospect theory perspective, withdrawal from any project before one has recouped previously 
invested resources should be perceived as a certain loss. Thus, sunk costs might indeed influence decisions to 
withdraw from or persist with projects in the face of positive as well as negative feedback. The results of Garland 
and Newport´s (1991) study provide an important base of empirical support for Kahneman´s and Tversky´s (1979) 
propositions. 
2.9 Escalation or Escalating Commitment 
Escalation or escalating commitment refers to the tendency for decision makers to persist with failing courses of 
action. Escalation may be seen as similar to sunk costs, or as a chance to recover sunk costs, although escalation is 
extended across several trials while sunk costs refers to the total accumulated investment (whether the investment is 
of monetary value, effort or time). In an escalation dilemma, costs are incurred, at the same time as there exists an 
opportunity to withdraw or to persist, and the consequences of withdrawal or persistence are uncertain (Staw & 
Ross, 1987). An escalation dilemma is thus related to a situation where things not only have gone wrong, but where 
potential actions aimed at curing the problem may actually deepen the difficulty. Escalation dilemmas occur when 
for instance a job, career, or marriage has grown increasingly frustrating, and it is uncertain whether greater effort 
or withdrawal will be able to improve the situation. The typical response to an escalation dilemma like this, is an 
irrational persistence (Brockner & Rubin, 1985) carrying the hope that things will turn out better in the end.  
There is some controversy concerning the explanation of escalation (see Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw & Ross, 
1987, for reviews of theory and empirical research). What is clear is that the different escalation situations have 
some common factors. First, all of the situations entail some loss or costs that have resulted from an original course 
of action. Second, the predicaments involve some continuity over time, and third, they comprise situations where 
simple withdrawal is not the solution to the problem. Escalation is believed to result from a combination of four 
macro variables, known as project, psychological, social, and structural determinants (Drummond, 1994). The 
project factors are concerned with the perceived benefits of a venture and with the costs of withdrawal. DM´s may 
be reluctant to forego previous investments especially where recoupment depends upon project completion (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985). The social factors include what Fox and Staw (1979) called external justification (face-saving). 
This is the desire not to lose face or credibility with others. DMs may persist in a course of action not only because 
they do not want to admit to themselves that they made a mistake, but also because they may be especially hesitant 
to expose their errors to others. Other relevant social factors that may motivate escalation include personal 
identification with an issue (Staw & Ross, 1987) and competition (Teger, 1980). Structural factors include political 
support, economic, and technical sidebets, administrative inertia and institutionalization (Staw & Ross, 1987). 
Institutionalization refers here to the fact that a project is tied integrally to the values and purposes of the firm. The 
four preceding factors are believed to come into play sequentially. Escalation begins with project variables, notably 
Journal of  Progressive Research in Social Sciences (JPRSS)                                                                                                                                                                     
ISSN 2395-6283  
 
Volume 3, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jprss                                                   124 
the perceived benefits of embarking upon a venture. Received questionable feedback is initially ignored, and then as 
failure becomes undeniable, and the social pressure precludes withdrawal. As the project grows, the responsibility 
diffuses. Social and psychological pressures therefore recede and persistence reflects structural factors (Staw & 
Ross, 1987).  
The tendency to escalate may also be explained, at least in part, by expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). According to 
such a viewpoint, DMs assess the probability that additional resource allocations will lead to goal attainment, as 
well as the value of goal attainment (i.e. rewards minus costs). This leads to generating a subjective expected utility 
associated with the decision to allocate additional resources. Brockner and Rubin (1985) discovered that individuals 
persistence at a task at which they were failing was greater both when they sensed that they were drawing ever 
closer to their goals, and when their goals were relatively high in value. A second category of explanations views 
people as following a self-justifying or rationalizing behavior rather than being guided by the tenets of expectancy 
theory. Couched originally in Festinger´s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, this viewpoint posits that DMs 
become entrapped in a previous course of action because of their unwillingness to admit that the prior resources 
were allocated incorrectly. Put simply, this means that people do not like to admit that their past decisions were 
incorrect. So it seems that the best way to reaffirm the correctness of earlier decisions is to be even more committed 
to them. A strategy that has been adopted in several studies of escalation has been to explore whether other 
behaviours stemming from the self-justification motive (besides continued resource allocation) are systematically 
influenced by conditions that are known to affect escalation. As noted by Conlon and Parks (1987), DMs that are 
concerned with self-justification, will search for retrospectively focused information as they contemplate 
subsequent resource-allocation decisions. Studies that have used different investment situations and 
operationalisations of the negative feedback and need-to-justify variables have yielded results consistent with the 
self-justification explanation of escalation (Brockner 1992). 
Despite existing evidence for sunk-cost effects, numerous questions remain about the relation between sunk costs 
and decisions to escalate investments in ongoing projects. The strong effects observed by Garland and Newport 
(1991) may have been due to a normatively rational, prospective consideration of incremental costs rather than sunk 
costs. Laughhunn and Payne (1984) proposed two alternative views to explain how a DM will frame a sunk cost (in 
their terms, sunk outcome) problem. This may be done either by use of a minimal account or by use of a 
psychological account. A frame based on the minimal account is premised on the assumption that history (the sunk 
outcomes) will be ignored by the DM, and that the sunk outcome problem will be framed to have a structure that is 
identical to that of the base gamble (that is the same problem but without history). One rationale for this framing of 
the sunk outcome problem is based on the cancellation effect of prospect theory. Laughhunn and Payne (1984) 
argue that cancellation allows a DM to disregard components of options that are common to them in order to focus 
attention on the components that distinguish them. Cancellation of sunk outcomes function to simplify the structure 
of a choice problem. A use of a minimal account to frame the sunk outcome problem, has a normative justification 
according to economic theories and theories of rational choice in business decision making. Framing based on the 
psychological account involves a presumption that DMs will not ignore the sunk outcome problems history when 
making a present choice. Staw (1981) developed a model of entrapment to explain why DMs, once committed to a 
course of action, stays committed to it over a time period longer than a rational analysis can justify. In Staw´s 
model, the DM will adopt a psychological account, when confronted with a sequence of choices over time, because 
of strong motivations to appear rational on a retrospective (historical) basis and to appear consistent in decisions 
made over time. 
3. Concurrent Decisions 
In a concurrent decisions situation several decisions are made simultaneously. Future outcomes of one decision is 
possibly integrated with future outcomes of a second decision. In situations with prior-outcomes, sunk-cost effects 
or in an escalation, the common nominator is that one or more outcomes have already occurred. One concurrent 
decision problem referred to as the jacket and calculator problem, was originally presented by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981). Here the question is whether the outcome of two simultaneous choices (buying a jacket and a 
calculator) are integrated or segregated. In this situation the decision maker has to decide whether to buy two items 
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Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $125 and a calculator for $15. The calculator salesman informs 
you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $10 at the other branch store, located 20 minutes drive away. 
Would you make the trip to the other store? 
High-price condition 
Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $15 and a calculator for $125. The calculator salesman informs 
you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $120 at the other branch store, located 20 minutes drive away. 
Would you make the trip to the other store? 
 This problem presents two simultaneous alternatives, each with three attributes, the jacket price, calculator price, 
and shopping convenience. The problem is concerned with the acceptability of an option that combines a 
disadvantage of inconvenience (driving to the other store) with a financial advantage that can be framed as a 
minimal, topical or comprehensive account. The minimal account includes only the differences between the two 
options and disregards the features that they share. In the minimal account, the advantage associated with driving to 
the other store is framed as a gain of $5. A topical account relates the consequences of possible choices to a 
reference level that is determined by the context within which the decision arises. In the preceding problem, the 
relevant topic is the purchase of the calculator, and the benefit of the trip is therefore framed as a reduction of the 
price from $15 to $10. Because the potential saving is associated only with the calculator, the price of the jacket is 
not included in the topical account. The price of the jacket, as well as other expenses, could well be included in a 
more comprehensive account in which the saving would be evaluated in relation to for instance, monthly expenses.  
Tversky & Kahneman´s (1981) original results shoved that the two versions of the jacket and the calculator problem 
were markedly different. 68% of the respondents were willing to make the trip to the other store in order to save $5 
on a $15 calculator (low-price condition), while only 29% were willing to exert the same effort when the price of 
the calculator was $125 (high-price condition). The respondents did not frame the jacket and the calculator problem 
in a minimal account, which involves only a benefit of $5 and a cost of some inconvenience (driving to the other 
store). Instead they evaluated the potential saving in a more inclusive account, which includes the purchase of the 
calculator but not the jacket. Applying the prospect theory value function it can be shown that a discount of $5 has a 
greater impact when the price of the calculator is low than when it is high, due to the principle of diminishing 
sensitivity.  
Henderson and Peterson (1992) conducted a study to investigate the jacket and calculator problem, resulting in 
approximately the same results as was found by Tversky and Kahneman. Henderson and Peterson posits through 
their categorization and script theory explanation that a reference state will always be developed and used to 
evaluate novel elements, options or events. A script can be defined as a sequence of causally related expectations of 
a familiar event. 25% of Henderson and Peterson´s subjects stated that they were willing to drive to the other store, 
and this is a percentage not significantly different from Tversky and Kahneman´s (29% for the $125 condition). In 
the low-price condition, 68 % of the 88 subjects were willing to make the trip to the other store. Kahneman & 
Tversky (1984) proposed that individuals spontaneously would frame decisions in terms of topical accounts. 
Topical organization, in conjunction with the prospect theory value functions concavity of value, entails that the 
willingness to travel to the other store for a saving of $5 on a calculator should be inversely related to the price of 
the calculator and should be independent of the price of the jacket. The comprehensive account assumes that the 
jacket and calculator prices of each alternative are edited by being integrated since they are attributes on the same 
monetary scale. This leads to the prediction of no change in preference across the two original versions of the 
problem, since the changes in jacket and calculator prices in opposite directions cancel each other out. The topical 
organization of mental accounts leads people to evaluate gains and losses in relative rather than absolute terms, 
resulting in large variations in the rate at which money is exchanged for other things. This point to a violation of the 
standard theory of consumer behavior, which assumes invariance and does not recognize the effects of mental 
accounting.   
Ranyard & Abdel-Nabi (1993) aimed to replicate Tversky and Kahneman´s investigation of a calculator price 
effect. Another more important aim in their study was to investigate the effect of independently varying the price of 
the jacket. Results from their study showed that only about a quarter of the sample (23%) said they would make the 
trip to save £5 on the expensive (high-price) calculator. With the cheaper (low-price) calculator, most people (52% 
and 70%) would make the trip. An effect of mode of travel was apparent. People were more inclined to walk to save 
£5 than to drive. Just over half (52%) were prepared to drive to the other store, but significantly more (70%) were 
prepared to walk in order to save the same amount of money. When asked to drive to the other store, people were 
slightly more inclined to do so when buying the cheaper jacket (56%) than compared to the more expensive one 
(44%). 
Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) also reported an interesting new result, namely that changes in the price of the 
jacket affected choice. The effect on choice was relatively small, compared to that of the calculator price. The jacket 
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price effect suggests that subjects may evaluate choice alternatives with respect to a comprehensive account which 
included the price of the jacket. The authors also performed a think-aloud study of the jacket and calculator 
problem. The coding scheme was divided into four mutually exclusive categories, ranging from low to high 
comprehensiveness on an ordinal scale. Results from the think-aloud part of the study showed that subjects 
generally adopted a minimal account. The subjects framed the choice as a conflict between an advantage of 20 
minutes less driving time versus a £5 price advantage, and their evaluation strategy, according to the authors, was 
simply to compare the two alternatives.  
Bonini and Rumiati (1996) reported five experiments in their study on mental accounting and the acceptance of a 
price discount. In their Experiment 1, the findings reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in the jacket and 
calculator problem were replicated. Experiment 4 was used as a baseline for comparing the other three experiments. 
The underlying strategy in four of the five experiments was to manipulate the mental segregability of the planned 
purchases (buying a jacket and a calculator) when a price reduction was assessed. The authors proposed and gained 
support for the hypothesis that by making the segregation of the planned purchases more difficult (by strengthening 
the relation between them) one could induce people to use a comprehensive mental account instead of a topical one. 
By using a more comprehensive mental account subjects were inclined to integrate in the jacket and the calculator 
problem. By providing a categorical link between the items, to embed the items in a shopping list, and to make the 
items part of an explicit expense budget, subject were shown to integrate the two items by using a more 
comprehensive mental account than when using a topical mental account as in Tversky and Kahneman´s (1981) 
original problem. Table 2 summarizes the findings in the jacket and calculator problem. 
Table 2.An overview of respondents’ willingness to make the trip to the other store in the jacket and 
calculator problem. Mean percentages responding ”yes” and ”no” with different calculator prices 
Problem                      Sample size                         Mean % yes          Mean % no  
Tversky and Kahneman (1981)                       
Calculator price $125                              93                29%            71% 
Calculator price $15                88   68%   32% 
Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993)                                                
Calculator price £ 115 (drive)                             75   23%   77% 
Calculator price £ 15 (drive)                200   52%   48% 
Calculator price £ 15 (walk)                175   70%   30% 
Think aloud study (average results)                48                              56%   44% 
Bonini and Rumiati (1996)    
Replication condition (exp. 1)     
Low-price calculator    50   60%   40% 
High-price calculator    50   40%   60% 
Same category condition (exp2)    
Low-price calculator     50   64%   36% 
High-price calculator    50   46%   54% 
Shopping list condition (exp.3) 
Low-price calculator     33   52%   48% 
High-price calculator    28   46%   54% 
Expense budget condition (exp.4) 
Low-price calculator     67   67%   33% 
High-price calculator    68   56%   44% 
Jacket mentioned twice (exp.5)  
Low-price calculator     50   54%   46% 
High-price calculator     68   54%   46% 
 An earlier paper investigated whether the loss-sensitivity hypothesis would be capable of also explaining how 
concurrent decisions are integrated (Boe, 1995). It was then assumed that one of the decisions were superordinate to 
the other. In my previous experiment this was operationalized by imposing an order on the choices. Thus, when 
making the second choice, it was hypothesized that subjects would take into account the potential outcome of the 
first choice. However, according to the loss-sensitivity hypothesis subjects would do that only if the outcome of the 
second choice was a potential loss. Therefore, the second choice was either between a sure loss and a risky loss or a 
sure gain and an risky gain. Integration was expected in the first but not in the latter case. 
In three between-subjects conditions, different subjects were given pairs of concurrent decisions, decisions with 
prior outcomes, and two-stage gambles, respectively. The prior outcomes were either gains or losses which 
corresponded exactly to the outcomes of the dominant options of the first decisions in the condition with concurrent 
decisions, whereas in the two-stage gambles the probability of reaching the second stage was the same as obtaining 
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the outcome of the dominant options of the first decisions in the condition with concurrent decisions. The second 
decisions were the same in all conditions. All subjects were also given a second block with only the second 
decisions. Thus, the existence of integration effects were possible to assess in within-subjects comparisons in each 
of the between-subjects conditions. Based on prospect theory it was predicted that subjects in the second decisions 
would chose the sure gain but the risky loss. However, if integrating a prior gain, subjects would when facing a sure 
and a risky loss chose the former because it would be framed as a sure gain. If integrating a prior loss, subjects 
would be even more inclined to choose the uncertain loss. No integration was predicted for second decisions 
entailing only gains. Under the conditions of the experiment (imposed order, a small number of possible outcomes 
of the prior decision) the same integration results were predicted in the condition with concurrent decisions. 
Consistent with the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), subjects were expected to ignore the uncertainty of 
the first stage in the two-stage gambles, thus leading to no integration in this condition. This result would also be 
consistent with integration in the condition with concurrent decisions. The design was mixed factorial with type of 
decision problem (concurrent decisions, decisions with prior outcome, and two-stage gambles) as a between-
subjects factor. Within-subject factors were whether the first stage was included or not, whether the outcomes of the 
second decision were gains or losses, and, in the between-subjects conditions with concurrent decisions and with 
prior outcomes, whether the outcomes of the first decisions (or the prior outcomes) were gains or losses. In the 
stage-gamble condition the latter was treated as a dummy factor. Different amounts of gains/losses were nested 
under the other conditions. The materials consisted of fictitious bets which were presented on a computer screen. In 
all conditions there was one block of single decisions, half of them consisting of a choice between an even chance 
of winning a certain amount or nothing and winning half the amount for sure. The other half consisted of an even 
chance of losing a certain amount or nothing and losing half the amount for sure. One option always dominated the 
other one. The second choice was the same as in the block of single decisions. Each one was combined once with 
gains in the first choice, once with losses. The obtained results showed that integration did not take place under the 
experimental conditions, and the results also failed to support the loss-sensitivity hypothesis, as no integration 
occurred in the conditions with concurrent decisions and prior outcomes. My suggestion is that no integration 
occurred since there were small differences between the single decisions and the other conditions. However, as 
expected in accordance with prospect theory, subjects became risk seeking when choosing between losses and risk 
aversive when choosing between gains. Prior outcome had an effect on current choices between losses but not on 
current choices between gains, which is in accordance with the loss-sensitivity hypothesis. After a prior loss, 
subjects became more risk aversive and were more willing to choose the certain alternative. An interaction 
condition by prior outcome was obtained, suggesting that the effect of prior outcome and the interaction between 
current decision and prior outcome was only reliable in the concurrent-decisions condition. The effect of prior 
outcome in the concurrent-decisions condition may not reflect integration. Despite the uncertainty in the 
experimental condition involving concurrent-decisions, prior outcome was found to have an effect in the 
concurrent-decisions condition, whereas no effect was observed in the prior-outcome condition where the prior 
outcome was known. In the stage-gamble condition subjects seemed to ignore the uncertainty. This has been shown 
to be the case in a study by Tversky and Shafir (1992). 
A well-known rationality principle of decision theory under uncertainty is named the sure-thing principle 
(henceforth called STP) by Savage (1954). STP holds as its basic assumption that if prospect x is preferred to y both 
when situation A occurred and when situation A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y when one isn’t sure 
whether event A has occurred or not. The STP rule has a great deal of both normative and descriptive appeal, but 
Tversky and Shafir (1992) has shown that subjects have a pattern of preferences that clearly violates Savage´s STP.  
Uncertain situations may be thought of as disjunctions of possible states, either one state will obtain, or another. 
When facing two gambles, a majority of respondents in Tversky and Shafir´s (1992) study accepted the second 
gamble both after having won as well as after having lost in the first gamble, but a majority rejected the second 
gamble when the outcome of the first gamble was not known. When the outcome of the first gamble is unknown, 
people do not know whether they are ahead and cannot lose or whether they are behind and need to recover their 
losses. This pattern of preferences is referred to as the disjunction effect, when subjects not knowing whether 
situation A has occurred or not, therefore may lack a good reason for making a decision. The following pattern: 
accept when win, accept when lose, but reject when one do not know, was the single most frequent pattern of 
preferences found by Tversky and Shafir (1992). The authors attributed the observed violation of STP to a loss of 
acuity induced by uncertainty about an outcome when the reasons for choice differ depending on that outcome. 
Gärling and Romanus (1997) replicated Tversky and Shafir´s findings that subjects segregated a prior outcome 
which was equally likely to be a gain as a loss. 
Gärling and Romanus (1997, Experiment 2) proposed a possible explanation to why subjects do not integrate the 
two decisions in a concurrent decisions problem. They found that a prior outcome was segregated in one condition, 
when it was considered a loss, and also segregated in another condition when the prior outcome was a likely gain. 
According to Gärling and Romanus, the uncertainty of the outcome of the first decision may counteract integration 
of concurrent decisions. Since loss-sensitivity is related to affective control and reactions and concreteness to 
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cognitive factors, it does not seem unlikely that there are larger individual differences associated with loss-
sensitivity than with concreteness as explanations of integration. 
Another example of a disjunction effect, in a one-shot prisoner´s dilemma game (henceforth called PDG), has been 
described in a study by Shafir and Tversky (1992). In a total of 444 PDG´s where the other´s strategy was known to 
the respondents, the majority of respondents chose to compete. When subjects had been informed that the other had 
chosen to compete, only 3% of the subjects answers resulted in cooperation. When subjects were informed that the 
other person had chosen to cooperate, a larger percentage of subjects chose cooperation. In another 444 PDG´s in 
which the other´s strategy was unknown (the disjunctive version), 37% of the subjects answers resulted in 
cooperation. Competition was found to be the most popular strategy in all conditions in the study. The single most 
frequent pattern was to compete in all three versions of the PDG. The next most frequent choice pattern, 113 out of 
444 PDG´s, was of the following form: compete when the other competes, compete when the other cooperates, but 
cooperate when the other´s strategy is not known. A consequentialist subject who chooses to compete both when 
the other competes and when the other cooperates, should also compete when the other´s decision is not known, 
according to the STP. Instead, uncertainty promotes a tendency to cooperate, which disappears once the other 
player´s decision has been determined. Shafir and Tversky (1992) interpreted the violations of STP as an indication 
that people do not evaluate the outcomes in a consequentialist manner, and they proposed two explanations for the 
findings. First, subjects might have cooperated in the disjunctive version of the game because they were afraid that 
their choices would be relayed to the other player before he or she made a decision. Second, Shafir and Tversky 
argued that the results could be explained by the hypothesis that the tendency to compete increases as the 
experiment progresses. Disjunctions of multiple outcomes are more difficult to think through, and as a result, are 
more likely to give rise to nonconsequential reasoning. 
4. Discussion 
The basic goal of this paper was to review empirical findings and explanations relevant to the issue when 
concurrent decisions are integrated and when they are not integrated. As there are few directly related studies, the 
paper has covered related phenomena, involving the effect of a prior outcome on subsequent decisions (Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990: Gärling & Romanus, 1997), sunk-cost effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Laughhunn & Payne, 1984) 
and escalation (Brockner, 1992). These phenomena have a lot in common, but may have different explanations. 
Most of the explanations may, however, be complementary. By comparing in this discussion the jacket and 
calculator problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) with Kahneman and Tversky´s (1979) study of concurrent 
decisions and Boe´s (1995) replication of their study, it will be possible to point to some similarities and differences 
in design and results which may give a clue to why or why not concurrent decisions are integrated.  
An interesting observation that arises from studies of the jacket and calculator problem is that a strong effect of the 
use of mental accounts has been observed in some studies of this problem (Bonini & Rumiati, 1996; Ranyard & 
Abdel-Nabi, 1993). Several possibilities to obtain integration in concurrent decisions problems has been tested by 
Bonini and Rumiati (1996). It was, for instance, possible to strengthen the relation between the outcomes or events. 
One way is to provide a categorical link between them. For instance, in the jacket and calculator problem, replacing 
the jacket and calculator with a table and a chair makes their mental integration more likely. Thinking about one 
purchase induces a person to also consider the other purchase, because of their categorical link. If the categorical 
link between two purchases facilitates their mental integration, then a price reduction of one purchase should be 
related to both purchases. Another way to strengthen the relation between purchases was to embed the purchases in 
a shopping list including several products. When the two purchases are inserted in such a list, they may form a sort 
of ”mental unit”. For example, when a person is planning to buy several products, he or she may consider how 
much money he or she would spend that day, and consequently, be induced to think in terms of a global expense 
budget. In this case, a price reduction of one purchase would be related to the planned purchases rather than to the 
target purchase. A third similar way to strengthen the relation between purchases was to refer them to an explicit 
expense budget. A person may plan to buy two products knowing their prices in advance. Thinking in terms of an 
explicit expense budget, for instance, knowing that one leaves home with a certain amount of money, may favour 
integration of the two purchases. In this case, the calculator price reduction will thus be related to the planned 
purchases. Finally, a relatively simple way to relate the two items in the jacket and calculator problem is to remind 
the subjects that they can also buy the jacket at the other store. If one considers the instructions used in the original 
formulation of the problem, one can note that the jacket is mentioned only in the first line. This problem 
formulation may have induced subjects to focus their attention only on the calculator price. In order to defocus 
subject´s attention from the calculator price, the jacket purchase could be mentioned just before the presentation of 
the choice dilemma. Bonini and Rumiati (1996), in testing this reported that the effect found by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) disappeared when a defocusing possibility was provided. 
An attempt to replicate Tversky and Kahneman´s study was done by Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) in order to 
investigate the calculator price effect. Another more important aim in their study was to investigate the effect of 
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independently varying the price of the jacket. In Ranyard & Abdel-Nabi´s study, a minority of the subjects said that 
they would make the trip to save £5 on the high-price calculator. With the cheaper calculator, a majority of the 
subjects stated that they would make the trip. An effect of mode of travel was found. Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi also 
reported that changes in jacket price were found to have an effect, although this effect was relatively small, 
compared to that of the calculator price. This effect suggests that subjects in their study evaluated choice 
alternatives with respect to an account which included the price of the jacket. 
Ranyard (1995) emphasizes the role of goals and aspirations in determining the “mental accounts” a DM uses. As 
an example one may mention that if the primary goal is to earn a fortune, any monetary loss or gain is likely to be 
registered and integrated. This means that the use of different mental accounts will be dependent upon the 
individual´s goals and aspirations. In this way, regarding the use of mental accounts, it may be more useful to think 
of the comprehensive accounts as more comprehensive topical accounts. It seems then that people construct mental 
models which incorporate topical mental accounts of varying inclusiveness. 
An important question emerging from this literature review, is the question why integration has been obtained in 
studies of effects of prior outcomes, sunk cost effects and escalation, at the same time as this has not been the case 
with concurrent decisions? Heath (1995) makes the interesting suggestion that people set mental budgets in order to 
track their investments. An individual first must notice the investments (prior outcomes, sunk costs) and, second, he 
or she has to assign the investments to their proper accounts. Borrowing terminology from financial accounting, 
Heath argues that the accounting process is divided in two stages: Expenses are first booked, meaning that in order 
for an investment to affect a budget, people have to recall or attend to the investment. Booking will be affected by 
the familiarity of the stimulus. Then, people must classify the investment as relevant to the mental budget, a process 
named as posting. Posting will be affected by issues that affect categorization judgements and judgements of 
similarity. This includes the relative complexity of the stimulus object and the target, and also the other items in the 
choice set. Heath distinguishes these two processes because they depend on different cognitive mechanisms. 
Booking processes are driven by attention, either you notice an expense or you do not. On the other hand, posting 
processes is driven by similarity judgments and categorization. A plausible explanation for integration of concurrent 
decisions is that subjects will have to book the different items in the same account. 
A second reason for integrating or not in concurrent decisions, may be whether or not the problem involves risk. 
Risk and not using mental accounts are thus possible explanations of why subjects do not integrate in concurrent 
decision problems. One difference between Tversky and Kahneman´s (1981) study of the jacket and calculator 
problem, on the one hand, and Kahneman and Tversky´s (1979) study of concurrent decisions and the replication of 
their study (Boe, 1995), on the other hand, is that the jacket and calculator problem does not include risk. In 
Tversky and Kahneman´s (1981) study and in my study risk was included. In the prior-outcome condition of my 
study, subjects had to imagine that they already had won/lost a certain amount of money in the first gamble, before 
attending to the second. The second gamble consisted of two alternatives, either to win/lose a certain amount of 
money for sure or a 50% chance to win or to lose a certain amount of money or to win or to lose nothing. In the 
concurrent-decisions condition, two gambles were played. Both gambles were to be considered at the same time. In 
the first there was a 50% chance to either win/lose a certain amount of money. In the second there was a sure 
win/loss or a 50% chance of winning/losing a certain amount of money or nothing. A possible explanation of why 
subjects did not integrate the two decisions is that the uncertainty of the outcome of the first decision counteracts 
integration. This explanation was proposed by Gärling and Romanus (1997, Experiment 2). Shafir and Tversky 
(1992) showed that when the outcome of the first gamble is unknown, people lack a clear reason for making a 
decision. They do not know whether they end up winning or losing after the second gamble because of the 
uncertainty of the first gamble. 
The study by Boe and Gärling (2015c) testing whether the loss-sensitivity principle could be extended to integration 
of the outcomes of two concurrent risky decisions did not receive supported. When investigating whether causal 
relatedness and uncertainty of outcomes of concurrent decisions would be more frequently integrated than unrelated 
outcomes, and whether certain outcomes were more frequently integrated than uncertain outcomes, it was shown 
that this affected integration. The means and ends of regular consumer products were more often chosen when they 
were presented together in two concurrent decisions as compared to being presented together with either unrelated 
options or singly (Boe & Gärling, 2015b). In another study it was found that when participants were forced to make 
choices, the means or ends of consumer products were chosen because the participants attended to the additional 
benefits, indicating an attentional bias. However, this was not the case when participants were free make both 
choices (Boe & Gärling, 2015a). The attentional bias was further tested to see if it could explain why decision 
makers sometimes fail to integrate outcomes of concurrent decisions. The attentional bias was supported as 
participants that revealed a more positive attitude toward driving were found to choose more frequently to drive to 
stores within walking distance compared to those with a less positive attitude towards driving (Boe, 2015). 
In the described studies of concurrent decisions, the possible options were either risky or riskless. Choices involving 
risk is concerned with known probabilities. If uncertainty is introduced into a concurrent decision, this means that 
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one does not know the probabilities. On top of dealing with uncertain probabilities, the individual has to deal with 
not knowing the possible outcomes of his or her decisions. In choosing between two uncertain concurrent decisions, 
it is even more plausible that an individual cannot assess the possible future consequences of the decisions that are 
to be made. This also affects the ability to integrate in a concurrent decision. 
It seems that when subjects were about to consider the two decisions in the concurrent problem simultaneously, 
they were not able to consider all the possible outcomes, even when one of the options consisted of a sure gain in 
decision one and a sure loss in decision two. The consequence was that the pair of decisions made independently of 
each other. Perhaps the salience of the sure gain and the sure loss made subjects ignore the other options with 
different probabilities of winning or losing. Failing to consider the consequences of each decision, may result 
because of a lack of ability to think through the possible consequences of the decisions in a concurrent decisions 
problem. Even when knowing the associated risk, this can be a problem. Risky prospects are by definition 
characterized by possible outcomes and by the probabilities of these outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). A 
complete representation of risky prospects requires that all possible outcomes of concurrent decisions are taken into 
consideration when making a decision. This is however difficult even in simple problems, due to limited cognitive 
capabilities.  
This paper has shown that there exist several possible explanations of why integration of concurrent decision does 
not occur. Bonini and Rumiati (1996) has shown that by manipulating the mental segregability of the items in a 
concurrent decision problem, it is possible to induce subjects to take into account previous decisions or outcomes 
when making decisions in concurrent decisions. It is also possible that integration of concurrent decisions will not 
occur unless some other conditions are prevalent. If risk is involved in a concurrent decision, this may make it 
difficult for the individual to relate the concurrent decisions to each other and integrate them. 
An idea for further research is to make subjects being able to think through all possible consequences in a 
concurrent decision problem. By explicitly illuminating the risk or uncertainty to the subjects, it may be possible to 
obtain integration in concurrent decisions. 
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